CHAPTER - 9
THE JUBBULPORE
MUTINY – 1946
The
mutiny at Jubbulpore took place between 27 February and 3 March 1946, about two
weeks after the Naval mutiny at Bombay .
The men who participated in the mutiny were all Indian Signal Corps personnel
posted at the Signal Training Centre at Jubbulpore (now called Jabalpur ). According to official sources,
1716 men were involved in the mutiny. The immediate provocation for the revolt
was the firing on the naval ratings at Bombay
and the harsh punishments awarded to the INA prisoners after the trials at the
Red Fort. The men also had certain grievances concerning pay, food and
accommodation that they placed before their superior officers and were agitated
when these were not heard. The uprising was peaceful and the participants did
not resort to violence of any kind. Like the naval mutiny at Bombay
and Karachi , the Jubbulpore
revolt was put down with an iron hand, by using British troops. There was no
firing, but a bayonet charge that left about 70 men injured, and three dead.
Though
the mutiny at Jubbulpore was at that time not
considered as ‘serious’ as the Naval mutiny, its repercussions were immense.
The earlier revolts in the RIAF and RIN, though more widespread and larger in
scale, did not really worry the British authorities, because the Indian Army,
on which they depended for meeting external and internal threats was still
considered reliable, having proved its fidelity during World War II. The mutiny
at Jubbulpore was the first major uprising in
the Indian Army during or after the war. This set alarm bells ringing from Delhi to London ,
and doubts began to be expressed on the steadfastness of the Indian Army.
Ultimately, it forced Britain
to reach a settlement with the political parties and quit India .
After
the end of World War II there was feeling of uncertainty among soldiers, with
the threat of demobilisation and loss of livelihood being matters of serious
concern. The return of a large number of troops from British colonies in
South-East Asia aggravated the situation, with military stations in India
In February 1946, there were two
major establishments of the Indian Signal Corps at Jubbulpore .
The first was the Signal Training Centre (STC) comprising No. 1 Signal Training
Battalion (Military) and 2 & 3 Signal Battalions (Technical). The second
was the Indian Signal Depot & Records, which comprised the Indian Signals
Depot; the Indian Signals Demobilisation Centre and the Indian Signals Records.
The Commandant of the STC was Colonel L.C. Boyd, while Colonel R.T.H. Gelston,
commanded the Depot & Records. Both these establishments came under the
Jubbulpore Area, commanded by Brigadier H.U. Richards, who also commanded 17
Indian Infantry Brigade. The Area came under the General Officer Commanding
Nagpur District, Major General F.H. Skinner, with his headquarters at Nagpur Agra
Conditions
at Jubbulpore were no different from those at
other military stations, except that the men, being mostly from technical
trades, were more educated. Many of the men undergoing long training courses
were not sure whether they would be retained or sent home in the next few
months. The delay in announcement of a clear policy on demobilisation had
created an air of uncertainty and restlessness, which could not remain
unnoticed. On 27 November 1945, Colonel Boyd had written to the Organisation
Directorate in General Headquarters (India
It is for consideration whether the present policy of continuing to put
men under lengthy courses of training, irrespective of the time they are likely
to remain in the Army, is not extremely wasteful both of instructors’ time and
Government..… Among these men unsettlement and lack of interest in their work
are already noticeable, since they think they will be released form the Army
before their course finishes. It should also be noted that it is the highly
educated men such as are enrolled for Group ‘A’ trades that are keenest to
leave the Army at the earliest possible moment in order to obtain highly
remunerative employment.….To carry on with Workshops and Operator training in
these circumstances seems to be a waste of time. The unsettlement in squads
already referred to is having an adverse effect on training …
It was almost three months before
General Headquarters (India), replied to Colonel Boyd’s letter, ordering the
immediate release of one thousand recruits then under training at the Indian
Signal Training Centre at Jubbulpore and Bangalore.3 By the time the
orders reached the STC the mutiny had started. Referring to the letter in his
report to the Area Headquarters after the mutiny, Colonel Boyd lamented: ‘It is
unfortunate that the decision contained therein could not have been come to
earlier’.3
Even
if the decision to release the thousand men had been taken earlier, it would
have been difficult for the Signal Training Centres to cope with such large
numbers. The Signals Depot was then not authorised a demob centre; it was
making do with an ad hoc demob centre that had a capacity to release only 70
persons in a day. The staff of the depot was already overworked and the
additional load would have stretched them to the limit. The severe overcrowding
and unsatisfactory living conditions only added to the unrest. The shortage of
staff affected management of security in the area, and the men had free access
to civilian areas. The Signal Training Centre, Depot and Records employed large
numbers of civilians, through whom political developments found their way into
the military camp and the idle minds of the men, easily converting them into
‘devils’ workshops’.
At
that time, units were given cash to purchase condiments, which were not being
supplied with rations. There had been a delay in purchase of condiments with
the resultant deterioration in the quality of food being prepared in the langars
(Other Ranks messes in the Indian Army are generally called thus. The term
is taken from the free kitchen in a gurudwara, the place of worship for
Sikhs). The personnel responsible for purchasing condiments were often corrupt,
and the quantity and quality of condiments was much below the prescribed
standards. This applied also to the rations supplied to the men through the
supply depot manned by the Royal Indian Army Service Corps. Other then rations,
even other stores and amenities authorised to the men were frequently pilfered.
The general standard of the men’s cookhouses, living quarters, bathrooms and
urinals was poor. Unlike in operational units, there was very little contact
between the officers and the men, whose grievances often went unnoticed or
unredressed. The quality of Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers (VCOs) and
Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) posted in instructional appointments in the
STC was usually good, but the same could not be said of the supervisory staff
responsible for administration, some of whom had been in Jubbulpore for several
years, developing a callous attitude towards the men and their problems.
A
feature unique to technical arms such as the Indian Signal Corps was the
presence of a large number of British soldiers in every unit and establishment.
Before the war, most of the technical trades in the Indian Signal Corps were
open only to British Other Ranks (BOR), with Indian Other Ranks being eligible
for the ‘lower’ trades such as operator visual, despatch rider, lineman, MT
driver etc. Before the war, the Indian Signal Corps comprised about two
thousand BOR, with the number of IOR being almost twice that number. When the
war ended, the number of BOR had gone up ten times to almost twenty thousand,
while the number of IOR had grown thirty times to sixty thousand. The rapid
expansion of the Corps necessitated several new trades being opened to Indians,
who began to be recruited as mechanics, operators and electricians. By the end
of the war Indians were employed in all jobs that were being done earlier by
Europeans, the exception being ciphers, which was not opened to Indians until Independence
A seemingly inconsequential cause
for discontent was the bad quality of gur (jaggery) being supplied to
the troops by resorting to local purchase. This had been officially reported to
the Centre Headquarters on 25 February 1946. However, the decision on the
complaint or the progress was not communicated to the men. On 26 February a
number of notices were seen pasted on the company notice boards in the lines of
the Demob Centre and No. 4 Depot Company. Some notices had ‘Jai Hind’ written
on them, while others called upon all Indian Other Ranks to cease work and, if
necessary, shed blood. The notices were
seen in the morning by Lieutenant Colonel E.W. Anderson, Officer Commanding
Indian Signals Depot, who reported this to the Commandant, Colonel R.T.H.
Geltson. Viewing the situation as serious, Colonel Gelston immediately sought
an interview with the Area Commander, to report on an ‘Intelligence’ matter. At
3 pm, Colonel Gelston and Lieutenant Colonel Anderson met the Area Commander
and apprised him of the notices. In the evening, all officers were called for a
conference and explained the developments. At about 6 pm all IOR of Records
were paraded and the Company Commander, Captain DS Garewal, addressed them, in
the presence of Lieutenant Colonel Anderson and the Officer in Charge Records,
Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Macdonald. The men were calm during the address, and
there was no untoward incident.
The mutiny started at about 9.20 am
on 27 February 1946 in ‘G’ Company of No. 2 Signal Training Battalion. The
first works parade was held at 7 am as usual, and the men were drilled. All
officers attended the parade which ended at about 8.30 am, when everyone broke
off for breakfast. Soon after breakfast, about 200 men, mainly workshop
trainees, formed up in the lines of the unit, just before the second works
parade was due to fall in. Most of them were in uniform, carrying flags of the
Congress and Muslim League. They formed a procession and marched out of the
unit, shouting slogans of ‘Jai Hind’ and ‘Inquilab Zindabad’. The Senior
Viceroy Commissioned Officer of the unit, Subedar Major and Honorary Captain
Ahmed Khan, asked them to halt, but they did not listen to him. Khan
immediately telephoned the Adjutant, who was having breakfast in the Officers
Mess. The Adjutant told the Subedar Major that Major C.C. Tucker, the
officiating Commanding Officer, had left the mess about five minutes earlier
and he should await his arrival in the office. He also informed Major D.C.
Dashfield and Captain J. Knowles, Company Commander and Training Officer
respectively of ‘G’ Company, who were in the mess with him. Collecting another
officer, Captain M.B. Myers, they left for the unit area on bicycles.
Information about the crowd
collecting and shouting slogans in front of the guard room of No 2 Signal
Training Battalion had also reached Colonel Gelston, whose office was located
just a hundred yards away. Gelston saw
the crowd leave the unit area and move along Peter’s Path, which led towards
No. 3 Signal Training Battalion and the Signals Depot. He telephoned the Area
Headquarters and also the Depot, warning them that that the crowd might come
that way. The Depot Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, was then in his
bungalow. When Gelston rang him up, he told him that he had called for a 15-cwt.
vehicle and was planning to come to his office, to report that notices had
again been seen during the morning parade. Gelston informed Anderson
Meanwhile, the procession was
proceeding on Peter’s Path, along Napier
Road
Colonel Gelston and Lieutenant
Colonel Anderson reached the crowd as they were coming out of No. 3 Signal
Training Battalion. They were soon joined by Major Dashfield and Captain
Knowles. The four officers got out of their vehicles and tried to stop the men,
who just rushed past them and marched through the Depot. They were very excited
and seemed completely out of hand, shouting slogans and waving party flags.
Lieutenant Colonel Anderson kept moving with the head of the column while
Colonel Gelston got in the truck and asked the driver to start. The truck was
soon surrounded by the mutineers and some even tried to get in. Gelston ordered
the driver to keep moving forward slowly. At one stage the driver’s foot slipped
off the pedal and the truck bounded forward, knocking over two men. Due to the
heavy rush, even Anderson Anderson
Realising that they would not be able to stop
the procession on their own, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson collected about15 men
and issued them with rifles. He also armed Dashfield and Knowles with pistols
and the party moved in a lorry towards the procession, which had already passed
through the Depot. Overtaking the crowd on the Outram Road Anderson Nerbudda Road Gorakhpur
Two Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers
of ‘G’ Company followed the crowd and attempted to fid out their complaints.
The main grievances of the men were: 4
·
Differences
in pay between IORs & BORS.
·
Poor
quality of rations.
·
Why
was fire opened on RIN ratings?
·
Why
were two INA officers sentenced to seven years RI when others were merely cashiered?
Undeterred by the attempts to stop
them the crowd proceeded towards the city. Having reached Tilak Bhumi, Tillaya,
they stopped and held a meeting, where speeches were made by some of the men
highlighting their grievances. There was a lot of slogan shouting and waving of
flags of Congress and Muslim League. Some of them went to the local office of
the Congress Party and sought the help of the local political leaders. An
officer from the Intelligence Branch of Area Headquarters and some officers
from the Signal Training Centre also went to the venue in civil dress and noted
down the names of the prominent persons taking an active part in the meeting
and discussions.
The news of the incident spread
quickly. There was considerable tension in the city and shopkeepers closed
their shops. However, the meeting was peaceful and there was no violence or
unruly behaviour by the men. At about 4.15 pm they started back for the unit.
By this time the military authorities had mobilised two companies of 27 Jat and
two ID (Internal Disturbance) companies of the Signal Training Centre in case
force was required to carry out arrests. But the crowd entered the lines
peacefully and sat down in the battalion area. The troops earmarked for
effecting arrests were therefore asked to stand down. The ID companies, which
had taken over the main guard, kot (armoury) and magazine guard were
later relieved by the Jat troops. The ‘ring-leaders’, whose names had been
noted down by the Area Intelligence Officer and by other officers from Signal
Training Centre, were asked to fall out when their names were called, which
they did without any protest. Major C.C.
Tucker, the officiating Commanding Officer of No. 2 Signal Training Battalion,
ordered a Viceroy’s Commissioned Officer to march the ringleaders to the main
quarter guard. Sensing what was going to happen next, the others pulled them
back into the crowd.
Soon afterwards, the Commandant,
Colonel L.C. Boyd arrived, followed by the Area Commander, who addressed the
men. He told them that they were all under arrest, but assured them that he
would forward their grievances to higher authorities. They fell in and were
marched to the Signal Training Centre Cage where the Commandant noted down
their demands, which were as under:- 5
·
Increase of basic pay
·
Increase of rations
·
Better accommodation
·
Equal treatment with British Other Ranks
·
Speedier demobilisation
·
Protest against speeches of the Commander-in-Chief and
Admiral Godfrey - the passage that if Indian Army soldiers are indisciplined
every force would be used against them
·
Release of all INA prisoners including Captain Rashid and
Burhanuddin.
·
Unnecessary to spend one crore on Victory celebrations when
there is food crisis in India
·
Ready to work if the demands are put forward. We did no
indiscipline while out. Pray no action against us.
After taking down their grievances
the Commandant spoke to the men and left. When the afternoon parade was
dismissed a number of men of No. 2 Signal Training Battalion approached the
cage and started milling around shouting words of encouragement. Those who
wished to join their friends inside the cage were allowed to do so and the rest
were ordered to return, which they did. After dark the same thing occurred. The
men inside the cage refused food and bedding. When the Commandant came to know
of this he entered the cage and spoke to the men, after which they agreed to
eat food and accepted bedding. Apart from sporadic slogans, the night passed without
incident.
By
early next morning, a British battalion, the Somerset Light Infantry had
arrived in Jubbulpore . A party of about 80 men
from No. 2 Signal Training Battalion assembled in the unit at 7 am and began
moving along the same route that had been taken by their colleagues on the
previous day, but before they could cover any substantial distance, they were
intercepted by a platoon of the British battalion. When addressed by various
officers, a few of them agreed to return to work but the remainder were left on
the roadside under the guard of British troops.
At
9 am No. 2 Signal Training Battalion was paraded. Major Tucker and Colonel Boyd addressed the
men and asked to return to work. Though the men remained orderly they refused,
saying that they could not do so because their comrades were in custody. If
they were let out, they would all go back to work. They were asked to return to
their lines and remain quiet, which they readily agreed to do. At about 10 am
personnel of No. 3 Signal Training Battalion became restive, and about 100 men
joined the clerks of the Records and sat down with them, demanding the release
of the men inside the cage. Some officers and Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers
tried to talk them out of this demand, but very few responded. A few men from
the ID companies who had been asked to stand down took off their equipment and
joined the crowd.
The District Commander, Major General Skinner
arrived to get a first hand account of the events. In consultation with the
Area Commander and the Commandant Signal Training Centre, a plan was made to
arrest the ringleaders. The officiating Commanding Officer and the Subedar
Major would enter the cage to reason with the men and try to effect the arrests
placidly. If this were to fail, then the ringleaders would be pointed out to
the Company Commander of the Somerset Light Infantry, who would make the
arrests forcibly. Major Tucker, Lieutenant Waugh and Subedar Major Khan entered
the cage and reasoned with the men for over an hour without success. The
Second-in-Command of 27 Jat and Lieutenant Colonel Poonoose, an Indian officer
who had been called from Katni, then entered the cage and spent another hour,
but failed to induce the ringleaders to give themselves up. There was no
recourse left except the use of force.
About
80 soldiers of the Somerset Light Infantry entered the Cage, with bayonets
fixed on their rifles. A few of the men were physically removed, amidst a lot
of shouting. Faced with the bayonets of the British troops, the crowd retreated
to one corner of the cage, which gave way under the weight of sheer numbers. A
large number managed to escape through the gap, while the remainder were
involved a scuffle with the British troops. Many sustained injuries from
bayonets and some were trampled in the stampede. The injured were immediately
removed to the hospital. Some of the men who escaped rushed towards the city
but others who were very frightened hid in huts in the lines or in the local
countryside. Information about the escapees was conveyed to the police and the
civil authorities, with a request to arrest them and bring them back at the
earliest.
The
news of the bayonet charge spread like wild fire in the Signal Training Centre
and at many places the men came out and demonstrated against this, resulting in
some more arrests. At 6 pm 14 men returned voluntarily, followed by some more
in smaller groups of two or three. They were all placed under arrest and put in
the guardroom. At about 7.30 pm information was received from the local police
that about 200 men who had been rounded up by them were being returned in
police lorries. The District Commander and Commandant Signal Training Centre
met these men when they arrived. The injured were sent to the hospital while
the rest were sent to the Jat lines. Meanwhile, about 100 men of No. 3 Signal Training Battalion continued to sit
in the Records lines.
While events had taken a serious
turn in the Signal Training Centre on 28 February 1946, things were far from
normal in the Depot and Records. In the morning about 200 clerks of the Records
collected near 4 Company lines and marched towards the Depot Battalion. The
Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, turned out his Internal
Defence Company and followed them, accompanied by his Second-in-Command and
Captain D.S. Garewal of Signals Records. They met the crowd of mutineers on the
bridge near the Indian
Military Hospital Outram Road
A company of the Somerset Light
Infantry had been placed around the lines of No. 4 Company. With the help of
some British soldiers, the Brigade Major of 17 Indian Infantry Brigade, Major K.B.
Langdon, arrested four Indian Other Ranks who were then marched away. After
these arrests and the departure of the Area Commander, about 100 men of No. 3
Signal Training Battalion rushed into the 4 Company lines and joined the
mutineers, accompanied by a lot of shouting.
Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Macdonald, the Officer-in-Charge Records and
Captain Macfarlane, Adjutant No. 3 Signal Training Battalion tried to quieten
the men. After about ten minutes the newly arrived recruits sat down behind the
mutineers already seated there. Some more officers from No. 3 Signal Training
Battalion arrived and tried to persuade their men to return to their lines but
failed. The total number of mutineers present in No.4 Company had now swelled
to almost 350. The Commandant Indian Signals Depot and Records, Colonel Gelston
spoke to them about their grievances and promised to do all that could be done
to remove them. The men also demanded the release of the four men arrested
earlier and the removal of British troops. At 4 pm the British troops were
withdrawn without any visible reaction from the mutineers. The night of 28
February passed off without any further incident.
In the early hours of 1 March 1946,
about 150 Other Ranks from 3 Signal Training Battalion left their lines and
marched in a procession towards Sadar Bazar, shouting slogans and waving flags.
This information was conveyed to Area Headquarters, which ordered a company
from Somerset Light Infantry to proceed to the garrison ground, where the crowd
was reported to have be headed for. At 7.30 am the Commanding Officer,
Lieutenant Colonel R.B.S. Eraut, the Adjutant, Captain Facfarlane and Jemadar
Natesan, a Madrassi Mussalman interpreter, proceeded to the Garrison Ground but
found no trace of the procession. Colonel Eraut went to the Area Headquarters,
while Captain Facfarlane and Jemadar Natesan searched for the crowd in the city
and the cantonment, without success. On their return to the unit they
discovered that 24 men from the Internal Disturbance Company had joined the
procession. The Commanding Officer ordered the Internal Disturbance Company to
stand down, and the British guard to take over.
At about 9 am information was
received that the procession was coming back in an endeavour to mobilise the remainder
of the unit. The Commanding Officer positioned a few officers and Viceroy’s
Commissioned Officers to meet the procession when it reached the lines and
divert them to the football ground. The Commandant reached the unit shortly
before the arrival of the procession at 9.45 am. Efforts to guide them to the
football ground failed and they moved towards the staging camp. They were
stopped en route and the Commanding Officer began to address them. At first he
was shouted down but eventually succeeded in making them sit down and listen.
The Commandant then addressed the men and listened to their points. Since it
was the morning break the rest of No. 3 Signal Training Battalion also gathered
round to listen. After the Commandant left for the Area Headquarters, the
Commanding Officer ordered the unit to parade for normal work. This order was
not immediately obeyed but after about twenty minutes all the men less the
demonstrators returned to work. At about 11.30 am Lieutenant Colonel Poonoose
arrived and addressed the men for over an hour, after which a few of them
returned to work. It appeared that many more were willing but were being
prevented by the leaders.
At about 13.15 pm the Subedar Major
reported to the Commanding Officer that the demonstrators were requesting
permission to go to the cook house and have their food, and promised to return
to normal duties after that. The Commanding Officer agreed making it clear that
the normal course of military law would be followed. Shortly after this the
Subedar Major accompanied by 11 men left for the Records lines in order to
persuade the party of mutineers from No. 3 Signal Training Battalion who were
sitting there to return. He came back after 30 minutes and reported that he had
not only failed in convincing the mutineers but had lost two men of this party,
who had been persuaded to join them. After lunch, all the men except for those
still in Records attended the afternoon works parade.
The situation in No. 4 Company of
Records on 1 March continued to be tense. Captain Garewal, the Company
Commander attended the first works parade at 8 am and found only two men
present. The mutineers were still sitting between the first and second
barracks, where they had been the previous day. Most of them were seated in orderly
ranks, with a few standing around and talking. At about 10.30 pm they became
noisy and began to form a procession, taking down several Congress and Muslim League
flags from the open ground between the barracks and the road where they had
been erected the previous day. However, there were many among them who shouted
to the men to stay in the lines, and the procession broke up into small
groups. At about midday the flags were
re-erected. Shortly afterwards a deputation led by the Subedar Major of No. 3 Signal
Training Battalion arrived to persuade their men to return. There was a heated
discussion followed by a lot of pulling and pushing, and some men were
physically prevented from going back.
At the second works parade, not a
single man fell in on the parade ground. The Officer-in-Charge Records was
informed that some men would go to work individually but were afraid to come to
the parade ground. At about 4.15 pm, Colonel Gelston and Lieutenant Colonel
Poonoose arrived and met the men. Poonoose spoke to men with all officers
present, and later alone. At 5.45 pm, Colonel Gelston and Lieutenant Colonel
Poonoose left to meet the Area Commander. At the Roll Call parade at 6 pm, 41
men were present. The rest of the men were still sitting between the two barracks,
but were quiet.
The previous day’s incidents had
been reported in several newspapers and there was considerable resentment at
the bayonet charge on the Indian soldiers. According to the newspapers, three
men had been killed, while 70 were injured in the bayonet charge. The District
Magistrate, Mr. E.S. Hyde declared Jubbulpore Cantonment a restricted area, and
the entry of civilians was banned. Notices to this effect were pasted at
prominent places and also announced by the beat of drum. Headquarters
Jubbulpore Area had also issued instructions confining all troops to lines.
Another infantry battalion, the First Royal Gurkha Rifles (1 RGR) had also
arrived.
On 2 March 1946, Lieutenant Colonel
Poonoose again spoke to the mutineers in Records and No.3 Signal Training
Battalion. He reported that he had failed to make any headway and found that
some men who had appeared to be amenable the previous day were now obdurate.
During the day, a message from Major General F.H. Skinner, General Officer
Commanding Nagpur District was read out to all ranks, in English and Urdu.
Making it clear that the action of the men who had collectively absented
themselves from their lines without permission amounted to mutiny, it went on
to assure that there would be no mass punishment and ‘justice would be tempered
with mercy’. The message also appreciated the conduct of those who had remained
staunch to their duty in the ‘face of provocation and bad example’.6
During the day, conditions improved.
In No. 2 Signal Training Battalion, all men reported for the first works parade
except for nine, who also reported after half an hour. In No. 3 Signal Training Battalion all men resumed
duties except for the 100 men in Records and those detained in the Jat lines.
Major Dashfield visited the Jat lines with some Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers
and tried to bring back some of the men, but they refused to come unless the
ringleaders were released as well. Colonel Gelston and Lieutenant Colonel
Poonoose visited the mutineers in Records in the morning at 7.30 am. Poonoose
spoke to them for about half an hour but found them in the same frame of mind.
He noticed that some men whom he had spoken to the previous day were missing,
and suspected that they had been forcibly prevented from attending his talk.
At 12.30 pm, Captain Garewal read
out the District Commander’s message, twice in Urdu and once in English, using
a pubic address system. Everyone heard this in silence. During the afternoon,
all was quiet and there was no shouting of slogans. At the evening roll call,
268 men were present. At 9 pm, the
mutineers announced that they were willing to end the mutiny. They burned their
flags and started reporting at the office, where their names were noted down.
The 100 men of No. 3 Signal Training battalion returned to their lines. By 11
pm, it appeared that all mutineers had surrendered, except the ones in the Jat
lines.
On 3 March 1946 a roll call parade
was held in all units at 9 am. Immediately afterwards some ringleaders were
arrested and sent to the Jat lines. Troops of 17 Indian Infantry Brigade had
placed a cordon around the lines. The Area Commander and Commandant Signal
Training Centre visited the mutineers in the Jat lines. They said that they
were willing to come back if all of them were released. The ringleaders among
them had been segregated and without them the others refused to return to their
units. During the next two days, the situation improved, but was still far from
normal. The men in the Jat lines refused to come out until their leaders were
released. There were no incidents on 4 and 5 March and normal parades were held
in the units. On 7 March all the men in the Jat lines returned. On reaching
their units they staged a protest for the release of the ringleaders,
threatening to go on strike again if this was not done. However, the threat did
not materialise and there were no untoward incidents after 7 March
1946. The mutiny was over.
The
mutiny had shocked the military establishment, especially the British officers
who had always believed that the Indian soldier would never rebel. The reasons
for the disaffection were quickly analysed and remedial measures taken. The
District Commander issued instructions to all concerned to improve the standard
of food and accommodation. Lieutenant Colonel Cassani from the Welfare
General’s Branch visited the lines of the Indian Signals Depot on 6 March 1946
and submitted a detailed report at General Headquarters (India ). The
report brought to light the pathetic conditions under which the Indian troops
lived. After it was found that some officers, Viceroy’s commissioned officers
and non commissioned officers had spent almost eight to ten years at Jubbulpore , those who had been there for over two years
were immediately posted out. The number of Indian officers was increased, so
that they could understand the problems of Indian troops.
Disciplinary action taken against those who
participated in the mutiny was severe and swift. Those against whom there was
even the slightest inkling were punished. Most of them were charged under
Indian Army Act Section 27 (a) – ‘joining, exciting, causing or conspiring in a
mutiny’ – and Army Act Section 27 (b) – ‘being present at a mutiny and not
using his utmost endeavours to suppress the same’. A total of 85 men were found to have been
actively involved in the mutiny. Eighteen men were tried by Summary General
Court Martial, of which 15 were sentenced to dismissal and imprisonment ranging
from one to three years, with three being acquitted. Seven men were dismissed
without trial and 19 discharged without terminal benefits. In addition, 41 were
discharged from service on
administrative grounds – services no longer required - without any enquiry or investigation. Many
more were sent home merely on suspicion and the statements of Viceroy’s and non
commissioned officers that were considered loyal by British officers. Most of
these men had put in long years of service and fought in World War II. They did
not get any pension or gratuity and many lived and died in penury. Their pleas
for redress fell on deaf years as instructions were also issued not to
entertain any petition or appeal unless Army Headquarters recommended it. Old
records contain several letters that bring out the pathetic state of these
unfortunate soldiers, who remained true to their salt and helped the British
win the Second World War. Having implicit faith in the British sense of fair
play and justice, they were surprised and disappointed at the treatment they
received at the hands of the Government of the day.
Though
bad food and living conditions were the major reasons behind the mutiny at Jubbulpore , it had a political tinge right from the
beginning. The firing on the naval ratings at Bombay
During a press conference on 3 March 1946, Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru referred o the Jubbulpore mutiny, and said, ‘…the men ... have
remained completely peaceful…The demands were for better treatment in regard to
rations, amenities etc, and equality of treatment between Indian and British
soldiers. There were also some political demands… Such demands should not
normally be made on the basis of a strike… We have seen recently strikes by
American and British servicemen’.8
Seth Govind Das of the Congress Party raised the
matter in the Central Assembly in Delhi
The
Army mutiny at Jubbulpore followed the
mutinies in the Royal Indian Air Force and the Royal Indian Navy. It is
pertinent to remember that one of the compelling reasons for the departure of
the British from India
was the apprehension that the loyalty of Indian Armed Forces was doubtful. Due
to obvious reason, the staunchness of the Army was more worrisome than that of
the other two services. On 5 September 1946, in a note by the
Commander-in-Chief on the military aspects of the plan to withdraw from India , General
Auchinleck was to record, ‘The importance of keeping the Indian Army steady is
emphasised. It is the one disciplined force in which communal interests are
subordinated to duty, and on it depends the stability of the country. The steadiness of the R.I.N. and the R.I.A.F.
is of lesser import but any general disaffection in them is likely seriously to
affect the reliability of the Army.’10
The
mutiny in the Signal Training Centre and the Indian Signal Corps Depot and Records
at Jubbulpore was only major uprising in the
Indian Army after the end of World War II. It was also the last uprising by
soldiers under the British Raj. In a sense, it was the proverbial ‘last straw’
that broke the camel’s back. Fearful of the effect it might have on the rest of
the Army, news about the mutiny was deliberately suppressed. Having occurred in
a small town, it was almost ignored by the national newspapers based in Delhi and Bombay .
The Corps of Signals also chose to ignore the mutiny, even after Independence , and old
timers talked about it only in hushed voices. Many officers were worried about
the stigma associated with a mutiny, which has always been regarded as the most
heinous of military offences. The fact that the Corps of Signals continued to
be headed by a British officer up to 1954 may have played a part in this.
Strangely enough, no record of the Jubbulpore
mutiny exists in the National Archives or the Historical Section of the
Ministry of Defence. As a result, it has been ignored by military historians as
well those who have written about the freedom struggle. The men involved in the
mutiny have also suffered – unlike the participants in the naval mutiny, they
have not been classified as freedom fighters.
ENDNOTES
This chapter is largely
based on N. Mansergh and Penderel Moon’s The Transfer of Power (London , 1982); Lt Gen. S.L. Menezes’ Fidelity and
Honour (New Delhi, 1993); and various files and documents in the Corps of
Signals Museum, Jabalpur
1. STC to GHQ (I), 27 Nov. 1945, Signals
Museum (SM), Jabalpur
2. GHQ (I) to Comdt. ISC Depot & Records, 21 Feb 1946,
(SM), 242-C, fol.92
3. STC to Jubbulpore Area, 9 Mar. 1946, (SM), 242-C, fol.93
4. STC to Jubbulpore Area, 27 Feb. 1946, (SM), 242-C, fol.134
5. Appx. ‘B’ to STC to
Jubbulpore Area, 8 Mar 1946, (SM), 242-C, fol.95
6. Richards to Boyd, Gelston and Anderson
7. Dipak Kumar Das, Revisiting Talwar,
(Delhi , 1993),
p. 294
8 Lt Gen. S.L. Menezes, Fidelity and
Honour (New Delhi, 1993), p. 404
9. Statement of Mr. Philip Mason, ICS, War Secretary, in the
Central Legislative Assembly on 15 March 1946.
10. N. Mansergh and Penderel Moon (ed.), The
Transfer of Power (12 vols, London ,
1982), viii, p.462
1 comment:
very informative well edited. Can u search detai
ls about ywo lessor known martyrs about which I can guve u some clue
Post a Comment